While progress in implementing the peace agreement in Mali has been halting, other conflicts that are not dealt with directly in the agreement but are indirectly connected with it have been gaining ground. One example of this is the ideological and economic dispute between secular and extremist actors. The extremists are exploiting religious motives to further their economic interests (e.g. drug trafficking) and their attacks are increasingly having an impact on the security situation. They are also putting pressure on the secular parties from the north of the country who have signed the agreement. Another example are the conflicts raging between and within communities, which keep flaring up despite efforts to partially resolve them in northern areas in October 2015 through local reconciliation agreements. These hostilities, which are not exclusive to the north – they can be found in central (e.g. in Mopti, where the Fula and Bambara people are fighting each other) and southern Mali too – are rooted in local contexts, but they have also been fueled by the weakness of some state institutions and the struggle for access to resources and sources of income to earn a living.

So what is to be done? Effective implementation of the peace agreement and cooperation between all parties involved, along with civil society and the population all over the country, is still the best course of action for counteracting these unwelcome developments. At the same time, it is important to develop approaches that involve civil society and the population as a whole in order to secure peace.

At local level, all stakeholders and external actors should use existing dialog and reconciliation forums as a platform for developing strategies to run schools, set up health centers, and resolve conflicts between and within communities. This could include, for example, a combination of small-scale, temporary reconciliation agreements and local development plans that involve local government officials, women, and young people as well as traditional and religious authorities. Local agreements of this kind, backed by support and assistance from international actors, would not undermine the political solution at national level. In fact, while building on efforts already underway to bring about local reconciliation, they would make it possible to meet the immediate needs of the Malian people, restore a basic level of confidence in the situation, and lay the foundations for national political solutions to specific unresolved problems.

However, measures like these can only be implemented if peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development work go hand in hand with a comprehensive understanding of security and if all actions taken follow a conflict-sensitive approach. They thus need to be based on a detailed and local conflict analysis that assesses the economics of local conflicts: after all, any measures taken are most likely to prove successful if illegal activities can be countered by offering constructive economic incentives as an alternative. It is also essential that such measures are not confined to the north, but applied to central and southern parts of the country too, where local development plans have already been drawn up to a certain extent but – depending on the region – have scarcely been implemented.

Civil society has an important role to play in championing this kind of approach: thanks to its convening power, it can help with negotiating small-scale measures at local level. It is in an ideal position to bridge the gap between the political process on the one hand and the needs and peacebuilding potential of the population on the other. Therefore, it should also be given a more prominent role on the Committee for monitoring the peace agreement in order to make it more inclusive and, ultimately, ensure that it is firmly embedded in society. Nevertheless, we should be wary of placing any naive expectations on civil society, partly because it first needs to be established who this civil society actually is, and partly because this civil society too is polarized by private interests. This therefore raises the question of whether and – more importantly – how external actors can support local civil society not only as an “implementer,” but also as an actor itself, driven by a vision and a strong sense of commitment.

If national and international actors want to prevent conflict, they also need to turn their attention to conflicts going on in other parts of Mali, such as the south. Here, too, relations between the state and society are often hampered by mistrust. Although there are state structures in place, most people turn to traditional authorities to find solutions to their problems. However, these traditional authorities often reflect established local power structures, which give young people and marginalized groups in particular little scope for action. The deep underlying causes behind the tendency for young people to fall into violent extremism are rooted in social and economic realities and existing power structures. Preventing conflict thus depends on addressing these root causes.

Finally, all international actors must try to work as closely to the context as possible: contextual knowledge, flexibility in implementation, and finding creative ways of developing solutions with the help of the local people are all characteristics of a context-oriented approach. This contextual proximity poses a major challenge, especially in northern and central Mali, where any external intervention provides a potential target for extremist groups, making it even more essential to leave as light a “footprint” as possible when working in these regions. This is another area in which international, national, and local civil society can play a crucial role.